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ARTICLES
ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VARIATIONS ON
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF BOOK ONE OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE WITH SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF FAULT IN THE
DETERMINATION OF MARITAL DISPUTES
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
INTRODUCTION
This article is intended to be a type of "structuralist"I corn-
* An Associate Professor of Law at Tulane University School of Law, and Assistant
Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center of Comparative Law, the author holds the Dipl6me
Sup6rieur d'Etudes Fran*aises from the Universitk de Poitiers (1971), the A.B. from Bow-
doin College (1972), the B.A. from St. John's College of Oxford University, where he was a
Rhodes Scholar (1975); the J.D. from the University of Virginia (1978); M.A. degrees from
Oxford University (1979) and the University of Virginia (1979); and the LL.M. from Colum-
bia University (1979).
1. The adjective "structuralist" is borrowed from linguistic and literary theory and
generally refers to the Sausurrian concept of structuralism-that a literary text or a particu-
lar language, although representative of history on a diachronic axis, can be considered inde-
pendently of historical developments on a synchronic axis (according to the now-celebrated
metaphor of the chess board). This general and admittedly simplistic definition of struc-
turalism adequately characterizes the basic methodology used in this commentary. The lan-
guage of Book I is separated from its historical evolution for the most part; the codal provi-
sions are isolated and taken as an organic whole. The refinements of the decisional law are
integrated into the commentary wherever relevant. The commentary also includes a com-
parative reference: where appropriate, the Louisiana law of Persons is contrasted with its
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mentary upon selected provisions in Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code. Its sole purpose is to illustrate, both for pedagogical and
doctrinal reasons, some of the analytical difficulties to which these
codal provisions might give rise when they are read in a close tex-
tual fashion. It should be emphasized that this study is a textual
commentary and not a historical assessment of the sources or ori-
gins of the codal texts-the latter analysis is outside the purview of
the present endeavor.
Accordingly, this article consists of a critical textual evaluation
of the relevant codal provisions of Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code, emphasizing internal inconsistencies, ambiguities, and ineq-
uities which point to a need for legislative reconsideration and re-
drafting. For example, it is difficult from a reading of Book I to
identify the actual impediments to marriage. In addition, the pro-
visions relating to putative marriage appear to lead, in certain cir-
cumstances, to an easily resolvable injustice to children born of
such unions. Moreover, the first book of the Code contains outmo-
ded provisions, such as article 120, which no longer reflect contem-
porary conceptions about the role of men and women in marriage.
Articles 138, 141, and 160 establish the primacy of fault in regulat-
ing marital breakdowns and their financial consequences; it is sub-
mitted that, upon a close examination of the codal provisions and
the applicable jurisprudence, the role of fault not only is ill-defined
but also needs to be reevaluated in light of the evolution of mores
and the emergence of trends in other civilian jurisdictions. Finally,
the issue of legitimacy and the presumption of paternity in article
184 are analyzed for their possible gender-based discriminatory
effect.
The gravamen of this article is not to advocate a particular
view of marriage or of the role of a fault analysis in the breakdown
of marriage, but rather to begin an inquiry into the structural and
substantive cohesion of Book I of the Code. The language of article
138 makes the dissolution of marriage a reality; the question re-
mains, however, whether the state, in the exercise of its legitimate
regulatory power in this area, has articulated a set of norms which
continue to be viable in contemporary society. While moral, reli-
gious, and psychological perceptions of marriage may conflict, it is
incumbent upon the legislature to arrive at a workable reconcilia-
tion of these values by elaborating a set of coherent guiding
analogue in other civilian jurisdictions, most notably France.
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principles.
THE IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE
The Evident Impediments
Louisiana Civil Code article 88 provides that lawful marriages
are those which "are contracted between a man and a woman and
solemnized according to the rules which the law prescribes."' De-
spite the fact that marriage in Louisiana is seen "in no other view
than as a civil contract,"' the state nonetheless, because of the so-
cial importance of marriage and the family, retains a prescriptive
authority which impinges upon the notion of freedom of contract
and the autonomy of the parties to establish the terms of their
agreement. 4 But, what are, under Louisiana law, the impediments
to the formation of this social contract between individuals?
The language of article 885 appears to prohibit homosexual
marriage; under this provision, the conjugal bond can be estab-
lished only between parties of different sex, "between a man and a
woman."' Article 93 seems to provide for an equally unambiguous
impediment. "Persons legally married are, until a* dissolution of
marriage, incapable of contracting another .... '- Although ques-
tions will arise as to what constitutes a legally dissolved marriage,
it is undeniable that a person who is already married cannot legally
enter into another marriage until the previous marriage has been
dissolved. Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 94 outlines in a
straightforward fashion the impediment to direct line relation-
ships: "Marriage between persons related to each other in the di-
rect ascending or descending line is prohibited."8 The clarity of the
Code, however, appears to end here; arguably, there are no other
impediments under Louisiana law to forming valid marriages.
2. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 88 (West Supp. 1982).
3. Id. art. 86 (West 1952).
4. See, e.g., R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 1-34 (1979).
5. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
6. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 88 (West Supp. 1982). A problem may arise here, however,
in relation to the marriage of a transsexual. On the transsexual issue, see Holloway,
Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 282 (1968).
7. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 93 (West 1952).
8. Id. art. 94 (West Supp. 1982).
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Age As An Impediment
Age traditionally has been considered an impediment to mar-
riage; it is within the legitimate scope of the state's regulatory
power to prevent and prohibit marriages between parties whom it
considers too young to take that momentous step. Certainly, a lib-
eral policy on the age question could lead to unstable unions which
might ultimately end in divorce, creating social welfare problems
with regard to children of the marriage, and perhaps the spouses,
and generally undermining the value attaching to family solidarity.
Yet, the Code does not establish an unqualified age impediment to
contracting a lawful marriage.
Article 92 attempts only in appearance to establish an age lim-
itation to marriage:
Ministers of the gospel and magistrates, entrusted with the power of
celebrating marriages, are prohibited to marry any male under the
age of eighteen years, and any female under the age of sixteen, and
if any of them are convicted of having married such persons, he shall
be removed from his office, if a magistrate, or deprived forever of
the right of celebrating marriage, if a minister of the gospel.'
The distinctive feature of this article is that the age prohibition
and corresponding sanction for breach are directed to the cele-
brants of the marriage and not the parties. An admittedly literal
reading of this paragraph of article 92 thus implies that parties of
any age can be married in Louisiana provided they can find a cele-
brant who will not question their ages. Moreover, it does not ap-
pear that such marriages can be annulled, for the sanction articu-
lated in article 92 is directed toward the officiating minister and
not the parties. The legislative intent in this provision seems to
have been to discourage such youthful marriages by placing sanc-
tions where they would be most effective, but to uphold such mar-
riages once they had been contracted. The wording of the article
and its focus upon the celebrant undermines the effect of the "age
impediment" and-what is worse-makes the notion of minimum
age a seemingly perfunctory requirement which lacks any juridical
consequence for the validity of marriage.
A seventeen-year-old male, for example, who wishes to marry
his sixteen-year-old girlfriend and does so by falsifying documents
or through some other artifice (or, say, simply because of the inat-
9. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 92 (West Supp. 1982).
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tention or physical disability of the celebrant) would, under article
92, not be subject to any sanction and the marriage, it seems,
would be considered valid. Only the celebrant would be subject to
a penalty. A reading of the formal language of the Code, then, sim-
ply does not support the conclusion that age is an impediment to
marriage. The first paragraph of article 92 could have read:
Males under the age of eighteen years, and females under the age of
sixteen cannot marry. Marriages which are contracted in violation of
these minimum ages will be considered unlawful. Ministers and
magistrates who are convicted of having married such persons will
be deprived of the right of celebrating marriages (in the case of min-
isters) and shall be removed from office (in the case of magistrates).
In its present form, article 92 implies a legislative intent to mini-
mize, if not eliminate, any age impediment to marriage in
Louisiana.
Minority
The provisions relating to the marriage of minors indicate that
the less-than-explicit language of article 92 regarding minimum
age for marriage is not the only shadow of ambiguity cast upon the
so-called "age impediment" to marriage. Article 97 provides:
The minor of either sex, who has attained the competent age to
marry, must have received the consent of his father and mother or
of the survivor of them; and if they are both dead, the consent of his
tutor.
He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to whom he ap-
plies for permission to marry.'"
Although this article refers to the "minor of either sex,"', reading
the provision in conjunction with article 37 makes clear that it ap-
plies to females exclusively. On the one hand, article 37 provides
that "[m]inors are those who have not attained the age of eighteen
years";1  on the other hand, article 92 provides, in relevant part,
that the competent age to marry for males is eighteen years.'3
Therefore, males cannot be married by a minister or magistrate
until they have reached the age of majority. Females, who can be
married by a minister or magistrate at the age of sixteen, must
10. Id. art. 97 (West 1952).
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 37 (West Supp. 1982).
13. Id. art. 92.
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receive the consent of both parents in order to marry before the
age of eighteen. There is an evident need to eliminate the discrep-
ancy between the language of articles 37, 92, and 97, perhaps by
amending the age requirement in article 92 to reflect the contem-
porary standards established in article 37. This reformulation is
the only way to give the opening clause of article 97 meaning
within the pattern of regulation outlined in Book I.
Second, the language of article 97 expressly provides that con-
sent must be had of the father and mother.1 ' What happens if the
parents disagree-if the mother agrees to the marriage, but the fa-
ther withholds his consent and cannot be persuaded to approve the
marriage? Unlike the current French law,15 the Louisiana Civil
Code does not provide that a disagreement between the parents
amounts to consent. Rather than provide an easy or a functional
remedy for these family disputes, the Louisiana Civil Code seems
to give priority to the notion of family solidarity-that a minor
within the family cannot establish her own family without the ap-
proval of both parents. Despite the equality of status that such a
provision implicitly establishes between the husband and wife in
terms of authority within the household (this contrasts markedly
with other provisions of Book I, most notably article 1201" and to a
lesser extent with article 21617), one wonders whether such a sys-
tem is not more conducive to family disharmony than to unity.
These doubts are especially strong when the legal consequences of
the failure to obtain the requisite consent are mapped out in rela-
tion to the validity of such marriages.
Third, unlike the provisions of article 92, the (minor must fur-
nish proof to the celebrant that she has obtained the consent of
her parents to marry. In direct contrast to article 92, article 97 ad-
dresses the party to the marriage, regulates her conduct, and im-
poses responsibilities upon her. This provision has all the makings
of an absolute impediment, were it not for the fact that the sanc-
tion imposed for the failure to comply with the requirement has,
by explicit codal language, no bearing upon the validity of such
marriages. Article 112 reads:
The marriage of minors, contracted without the consent of the fa-
14. Id. art. 97 (West 1952).
15. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 148 (Fr.).
16. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1952).
17. Id. art. 216.
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ther and mother, can not for that cause be annulled, if it is other-
wise contracted with the formalities prescribed by law; but such
want of consent shall be a good cause for the father and mother to
disinherit their children thus married, if they think proper."8
In summary, the codal provisions relating to the age require-
ment for marriage are confusing in their substance and unclear in
their policy. The Code appears simultaneously to affirm its com-
mitment to traditional views about the power of the state to pre-
scribe age requirements, and to subv9rt those traditional principles
by rendering them ineffective to influence the legal validity of non-
complying marriages. The Code seems to proclaim family solidarity
as the driving force of the law of Persons and, in the same breath,
couches its proclamation in language that speaks more to the right
of adolescents to marry despite would-be impediments of the state
or the opposition of the parents. Given this oscillation, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the notion of "age impediment" to mar-
riage is still a part of Book I of the Code. One might be tempted to
conclude that age simply has no direct bearing upon the validity of
marriage; that, despite the apparent coexistence of competing pol-
icy perspectives, the Code appears to validate marriages despite
failure to respect the age requirement. This statement seems to be
the message the Code conveys to the courts and to the legal com-
munity; obviously, the message could have been drafted in more
forthright and less convoluted language. 19
Consanguinity
Nor are the consanguinity prohibitions free of difficulty. While
the language of article 94 is classic and clear-cut, article 95 con-
tains a troublesome and perplexing paragraph. Article 94 estab-
lishes unequivocally that the scope of the consanguinity prohibi-
tion extends to "persons related to each other in the direct
ascending or descending line," adding that "[t]his prohibition is
not confined to legitimate children, it extends also to children born
out of marriage. '20 The language of article 95, which establishes
the impediment relating to collateral relationships, reads in rele-
vant part: "Among collateral relations, marriage is prohibited be-
18. Id. art. 112.
19. For a discussion of this topic, see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the
1978 Regular Session-A Student Symposium, 39 LA. L. REV. 129 (1978) and Note, 36 LA.
L. REV. 826 (1976). See also R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 54-56.
20. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 94 (West Supp. 1982).
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tween brother and sister, whether of the whole or of the half blood,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, between uncle and niece, be-
tween aunt and nephew, and also between first cousins."2' The se-
rious tenor of this provision and its status as a bona fide and un-
qualified impediment to marriage is attested to by the subsequent
language of the article, preventing the evasion of the impediment
through jurisdictional and procedural stratagems:
No marriage contracted in contravention of the above provisions in
another state by citizens of this state, without first having acquired
a domicile out of this state, shall have any legal effect in this state.
No officer whose duty it is to issue a marriage license shall do so
until he shall have received an affidavit from one of the parties to
the marriage to the effect that he or she is not related to the other
party within the degree prohibited hereinbefore. 21
These two statements clearly evidence a legislative intent to have
the impediment of collateral relationships fully applied and en-
forced, translating a commonly-held view that such marital unions
are morally abhorrent and biologically dangerous.
The third paragraph of article 95, however, undercuts and per-
haps eliminates the effect of the foregoing language. It reads that
"[a]ll such marriages heretofore made in contravention of the
above provisions shall be considered as legal. ' ' 28 In other words, all
marriages entered into before 1981, the date of the last reenact-
ment of the third paragraph, which violated the impediment of
collateral relationships, are nonetheless lawful.24 The language of
the third paragraph raises two questions: (1) What is the status of
the legal impediment to marriage relating to collateral relation-
ships? (2) What is the future status of the impediment for mar-
riages that are entered into after 1981? Does the third paragraph
of article 95 in effect indicate a legislative intent to eliminate the
impediment while maintaining it formally and perfunctorily in the
Code?
By enacting this third paragraph, it appears evident that the
legislature was responding to a social problem, namely, that there
may be too many marriages of this type, especially first cousin
marriages, in Louisiana to apply a blanket prohibition and thereby
21. Id. art. 95.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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undermine a wide number of extant relationships. On the one
hand, the legislature achieved a rather delicate balance between
certain public policy considerations regarding marriage and the
need to respond with an intelligent sense of realism and sensitivity
to a current problem. On the other hand, in light of the difficulties
that might attend the interpretation of the other impediments to
marriage in Chapter Two of Title Four, one wonders whether the
integration of a wide-ranging exception was the most appropriate
way of responding to the problem. From the perspective of general
interpretation, paragraph three of article 95 at least places the im-
pediment of collateral relationships in an ambiguous posture and
may even appear to gut the impediment entirely. Obviously, the
legislature wanted to maintain the statement of this classical im-
pediment in the Code, but, in its present form with the addition of
the third paragraph, it seems-at least to some degree-that the
provision is meaningless. This interpretation is buttressed by the
fact that the whole of Chapter Two seems to adopt, albeit indi-
rectly, a very restrictive attitude toward the notion of legal impedi-
ments to marriage-an attitude which gains some expression in the
language of article 96, which reads that "[a]ll other impediments
on account of relationship or affinity are abolished. '2 5
Interpreted as an organic whole, Chapters One and Two of Ti-
tle Four are characterized by an understated, but nonetheless dis-
tinct, policy that the power of state regulation should be mini-
mized whenever possible and the parties given the right, despite
certain disabilities, to enter into the contractual arrangement. It
would appear, however, to be more logical and consistent to articu-
late these policy objectives in language that more clearly reflects
this basic legislative intent, thereby clarifying the exact status of
the would-be age and collateral relationship impediments.
THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE RULES
Judicial Construction of Articles 117 and 118
The key provision of articles 117 and 118 is the good faith re-
quirement-a null marriage will produce its civil effects as to the
parties and their children only if the marriage was contracted in
good faith.2 6 If only one of the parties acted in good faith, i.e., was
25. Id. art. 96 (West 1952).
26. Id. arts. 117 & 118.
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unaware, for example, that his or her partner was already married,
then, under article 118, "the marriage produces its civil effects only
in his or her favor, and in favor of the children born of the mar-
riage. ''1 7 The courts, in their jurisprudence, have interpreted the
provisions of articles 117 and 118 quite liberally,28 in conformity
with what seems to be the legislative intent that underlies the
codal language.
According to the jurisprudence, the putative marriage doctrine
means that the civil effects of marriage will flow in favor of the
party who marries in good faith and the children born of that mar-
riage.29 Conferring the status of a putative spouse upon a partner
to a void marriage is especially important for wrongful death and
workmen's compensation actions;80 the courts, for example, have
excluded concubines (defined by the courts as a bad faith spouse in
a putative marriage) from benefits under workmen's compensation
statutes."1 A good faith putative wife has the right of the surviving
wife to the marital portion. 2 Moreover, under article 160, the good
faith putative wife may be entitled to permanent alimony from a
27. Id. art. 118.
28. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980); King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975); In re Koonce, 380 So. 2d 140 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ denied, 383 So. 2d 23 (La. 1980).
29. See, e.g., Kimball v. Folsom, 150 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. La. 1957); Weaver v. Byrd,
126 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 126 So. 2d 385 (La. 1960); Succession of
Hopkins, 114 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
30. See, e.g., King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975); Succession of Fields, 222
La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977). But see Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031
(La. 1978), in which former Justice Tate, now on the Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversed the jurisprudential position established in Humphreys v. Marquette Cas. Co., 235
La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (La. 1958), disallowing workmen's compensation benefits to concu-
bines. The Tate opinion in Henderson is characteristically brilliant and masterful; it is cast
in an analytic mold that usually applies in delictual liability cases. Rather than focusing
upon the family law aspect of the litigation, Justice Tate, to the vehement objections of
former Justice Summers, emphasizes exclusively the socioeconomic purpose of the work-
men's compensation statute, disregarding totally the very pertinent language of article 88 of
the Code. Despite the limited character of its holding, Henderson appears to work a sub-
stantial change upon Book I without ever taking its provisions into account. While the re-
sult is far from objectionable, especially in light of the circumstances of the case, it may
herald the expansion of judicial discretion and activity in this area, leading to the applica-
tion of a type of tort liability calculus in Persons litigation. In light of its implications upon
the distinctly civilian features of this litigation and upon the notion of state regulation and
public policy, the Henderson reasoning and holding may represent an interesting but unto-
ward judicial initiative.
32. See, e.g., Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952).
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bad faith husband,33 (presumably, uniquely without reference to
fault since no marriage existed in which fault could take place).
The children born of such a union are legitimate provided at least
one spouse contracted the marriage in good faith.3 4 The civil ef-
fects of marriage will continue for as long as the putative spouse
remains in good faith, i.e., they will terminate upon the spouse
gaining knowledge of the invalidity of the marriage.3 5
The Test of Good Faith
As mentioned previously, the crucial requirement of the puta-
tive marriage doctrine is that it applies only when at least one of
the parties is in good faith. The test applied by the courts in Loui-
siana to determine good faith centers upon the determination of
whether the spouse claiming the effects of a putative marriage had
an honest and a reasonable belief that the marriage was valid and
that no legal impediment existed.36 Decisional law has emphasized
that the test to assess the quality of the spouse's belief does not
require an absolute belief, but rather a relative one.3 7 Moreover,
the existence of a good faith belief has been characterized as a fac-
tual question, to be determined in an ad hoc fashion according to
the specific circumstances of each case."' In addition, courts have
ruled that, when a claim of putative marriage arises, good faith is
presumed to exist in favor of the party claiming to be a putative
spouse who entered into the marriage without any impediment.3 9
Finally, in another formulation of the presumptive standard, the
courts have held that good faith on the part of the parties to a
33. See, e.g., Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974). See also Annot., 81
A.L.R.3d 281 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Farrell
v. Farrell, 275 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
35. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1979); Succession of Pigg, 228 La.
799, 84 So. 2d 196 (1955); Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952); Clark v.
Clark, 192 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Succession of Primus, 131 So. 2d 319 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961). But see Brinson v. Brinson, 233 La. 417, 96 So. 2d 653 (1957).
37. See, e.g., Succession of Primus, 131 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
38. See, e.g., Eddy v. Eddy, 271 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), writ refused, 272
So. 2d 695 (La. 1973); Jones v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 173 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ refused, 247 La. 1019, 175 So. 2d 302 (1965); Succession of Davis, 142 So. 2d 481 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962).
39. See, e.g., Succession of Fuselier, 325 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), writs
refused, 329 So. 2d 462 (La. 1976).
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putative marriage is presumed, and the burden of proof to estab-
lish bad faith rests with the opponent. Any doubts will be resolved
in favor of a finding of good faith. 0
The Rights of the Children
Despite the liberal judicial construction and application of ar-
ticles 117 and 118 and the flexible definiton of the good faith re-
quirement, one inequity seems to arise from the literal language of
the codal provisions. For the adults in the relationship, putative
status has an important impact upon alimony considerations,
wrongful death actions, and workmen's compensation claims as
well as upon succession rights. For example, according to the juris-
prudence, a good-faith putative wife may be entitled to permanent
alimony as -a civil effect of a putative marriage from a bad-faith
husband.41 Moreover, if a man marries a second wife who is in
good faith, but the man does not have his first marriage dissolved,
both his spouses are allowed to share in his succession, each spouse
being entitled to one-half of the community property acquired dur-
ing the coexistence of the two marriages.42
Upon initial analysis, the legal rights of the children born of a
would-be putative marriage appear to be as strongly protected as
those of a good-faith putative spouse. For example, in circum-
stances in which a putative marriage ends soon after the birth of a
child, that child is entitled, according to the decisional law, to a
forced portion amounting to one-third of his father's estate, or he
can share equally with his half-brother in his father's succession
(in addition to having a claim to child support).4" Moreover, the
courts also have held that a child born of a putative marriage-one
contracted in good faith by at least one of the parties-is consid-
ered a legitimate child as to both contracting parties." This appar-
ently liberal jurisprudential position, inspired in all likelihood by
the express language of article 118, contains the seeds of a flagrant
40. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
41. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956); Succession of
Choyce, 183 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 249 La. 64, 184 So. 2d 735 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
44. See, e.g., Cortes v. Fleming, 267 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974); Melancon v. Sonnier, 157 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963).
1010 [Vol. 27:999
Role of Fault in Marital Disputes
inequity which stands in complete contradistinction to the pre-
1976 decisional law regarding the legitimacy of children and the
presumption of paternity contained in article 184. The codal provi-
sions and the decisional law that accompanies them and illustrates
their meaning make the status of children totally dependent upon
whether at least one of the parties contracted the marriage in good
faith. According to the jurisprudence, in circumstances in which
both parties contracted the marriage with knowledge, for example,
of an undissolved prior union, i.e., neither party was in good faith,
the marriage is void ab initio and does not produce any legal effect
as to the issue."'
The express language of article 118 leaves the courts with little
recourse but to apply the good faith requirement as it is stated.
The explicit language and unmistakable intent of a codal provi-
sion, however, do not always act as a sufficient obstacle to judicial
creativity, preventing the courts from finding ambiguity even in
the most clear-cut provisions and reaching holdings which, despite
their evident departure from the result mandated by the legislative
will, foster a judicially-favored policy objective. An evident case in
point of this type of judicial legislation concerns the pre-1976 juris-
prudence 'relating to the article 184 presumption of paternity.
There, the courts sometimes attributed paternity to a husband de-
spite uncontestable biological facts to the contrary."' The policy
objective here was to confer the status of legitimacy upon all chil-
dren (who, in this equation, were innocent victims) at any price
and in complete disregard of the rights and interests of blameless
husbands of wives who engaged in provable extra-marital episodes.
Reasoning by analogy from the article 184 jurisprudence, the
courts, when confronted with a policy dilemma under article 118,
had a choice between two alternatives: either subvert the semantic
content of article 118 or engage-by a relaxation of evidentiary
standards-in a process of finding good faith on the part of at least
one spouse in every putative marriage case. The Louisiana courts,
however, appeared to have found each alternative unsatisfactory,
perhaps in light of the implications of such a position for alimony,
wrongful death, and workmen's compensation actions. In a word,
the courts seem to have applied the language of article 118 without
any overriding policy objective in mind which would contradict the
45. See, e.g., Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
46. See Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on
Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REv. 59 (1976).
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express language of the codal provision.
This judicial construction, however, is inconsonant with the
policy imperatives that underpin the legitimacy rulings, creating a
tension between the manner in which the courts interpret two dif-
ferent but closely related sections of Book I. In marked contrast to
the paternity holdings, under article 118 the children born of a
nonputative void marriage are helpless innocent victims who pay
the price for the conduct of two adults: their status as legitimate or
illegitimate children is determined completely by the acts and in-
tentions of their biological parents (at least one of whom must
have contracted the marriage in good faith if the children are to
gain the status of legitimate children).
Recommendations: The French Example
It could and probably will be argued that this type of inequity,
given the liberal judicial definition of good faith in this context and
the remote possibility that a suitable case would arise, is of no
practical moment. Such cases, however, are far from inconceivable;
they have actually arisen.' 7 More importantly, in systemic terms, a
codal provision bearing the seeds of an injustice should be recon-
sidered and modified. Moreover, if the Code is to be seen as an
organic text which provides unambiguous and principled juridical
guidance for the regulation of social relationships, it appears incon-
gruous to allow related sections of the same book of the Code to be
construed with a different policy calculus in mind. Little seems to
be at stake regarding the concept of family solidarity-the often
cited ideological value promoted by the Code. The rights and in-
terests of children whose parents married without conforming to
legal prescriptions appear to be the paramount consideration in
this framework.
Engaging in judicial distortion or disregard of the unmistaka-
ble language of article 118 is inapposite in a civilian jurisdiction.
Reformulation of the codal language is a more appropriate solution
and could be achieved by comparing the Louisiana provisions to
their analogues in the French Code civil. Articles 201 and 202 of
the French Code establish two distinct sets of rules relating to the
legal consequences of a would-be putative union. One regime per-
tains to the spouses and the other concerns the children born of
47. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
1012 [Vol. 27:999
Role of Fault in Marital Disputes
such a marriage. Much like its counterpart in the Louisiana Code,
article 201 of the French Code civil" provides that a "null mar-
riage produces its effects in regard to the spouses if the marriage
was contracted in good faith."' 9 The language of article 201 further
states that "if there is good faith only on the part of one spouse,
the marriage will produce its effects only as to that spouse. ' Un-
like its analogue in the Louisiana Code, article 202 of the French
Code civil" states that the civil effects of a null marriage will take
place in relation to the children of the marriage "even if both
spouses are in bad faith. '6 2 In these cases, the questions relating to
the children will be handled as in a divorce case; 3 their status as
legitimate children is never brought into question.
The comparison to French law is instructive and provides a
clear example of how to eliminate the inequity that might attend
the literal application of the good faith requirement in articles 117
and 118 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The integration of a provision
similar to article 202 of the French Code civil would eliminate any
possibility that children of a void marriage could be victimized by
the actions of their biological parents. This type of outcome not
only corresponds with a basic common-sense understanding of
what result should be achieved in such situations, but also it is in
keeping with the liberal thrust of the judicial construction of arti-
cles 117 and 118 and the jurisprudence and recent legislation con-
cerning the legitimacy question. Finally, such a modification of the
codal text would not compromise the commitment of the Civil
Code to the concept of family solidarity (if that value remains a
part of the ideological foundation of the Code).
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES BETWEEN SPOUSES
Articles 119 and 120 of the Louisiana Civil Code articulate the
respective rights and duties of married persons." The substance of
these provisions, in some respects, is inconsistent with the recent
reform of Book 3 of the Code" and raises issues regarding the sta-
48. C. civ. art. 201.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. art 202.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 119 & 120 (West 1952).
55. See Riley, Analysis of The 1980 Revision of The Matrimonial Regimes Law of
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tus of women under Louisiana's Law of Persons. Article 119 clearly
establishes that a principle of equality (in the sense of mutuality
and reciprocity) governs the duties of husbands and wives. The
parties to the marriage "owe to each other mutually, fidelity, sup-
port and assistance."56 The specific content of these duties has
been defined by the courts in the context of particular cases;5 7
since they have a public policy character, these duties cannot be
modified by the agreement of the parties.5 8
The substance of article 120 contains the statement of a more
traditional, if not outmoded, view of the respective position of the
husband and wife in the marriage relationship. According to the
language of article 120, "[t]he wife is bound to live with her hus-
band and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband
is obliged to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is re-
quired for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and
condition."5 9 Although the husband and wife both have obligations
under this provision, the notion of mutuality is only dimly appar-
ent and certainly does not imply equal duties between the spouses.
Rather, article 120 emphasizes consecrated social and economic
differences between the spouses. The Louisiana Code here is faith-
ful to a long-standing civilian tradition of the bonus paterfamilias
which views the husband as the head of the household and the
primary authority figure in the family. Obviously, this tradition
upholds the notion of family solidarity in its classical sense; estab-
lishing one spouse as the principal authority in the family mini-
mizes the disunity that can emerge from uncontrollable dissent be-
tween the spouses. Moreover, it appears that the language of
article 120 reflects an economic reality that may still characterize
most Louisiana households: the husband is the principal source of
income for the family, and his occupation may require him to move
to another location. In order to keep the family together during
what may be a difficult transition, the Code obliges the wife and
children to accompany the husband and father to the new location,
provided the husband welcomes the wife to the new domicile and
Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453 (1980).
56. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 119 (West 1952) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 382 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Hingle v. Hingle,
369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 966 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
59. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1952).
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furnishes her with the "convenience of life, in proportion to his
means and condition.' ' 60
The decisional law, of course, has addressed the evident
problems of defining the circumstances in which a refusal to follow
the husband constitutes abandonment, 6' when his choice of a con-
jugal domicile is unreasonable," and what is meant by the term
"convenience of life."6" The language and substance of article 120,
however, raise preliminary issues of more fundamental importance.
First, there is. the question of the consistency between the sub-
stance of article 120 on the one hand and, on the other hand, the
language of article 119 and the recent reform of Book 3 which now
provides for the equal management of the community property re-
gime by the spouses.6 4 Moreover, the maternal preference rule in
child custody cases has been challenged by the best-interest-of-
the-child formula in article 14611 and the former gender-based dis-
crimination for alimony purposes has been abolished under the re-
formulation of article 160.6 In light of these developments, which
neutralized in terms of gender-based distinctions the codal texts,
why does article 120 continue to express the duty of married
couples to cohabit in terms of sexual differences? This unjustified
inconsistency has dire implications for the legal status of women in
marriage. Are they to have an inferior status to men in terms of
conjugal authority? Other civilian jurisdictions, like France, have
eliminated any formal legal disparity between men and women in
the marital relationship. According to article 215 of the French
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 232 La.
747, 95 So. 2d 298 (1957).
62. See, e.g., Bush v. Bush, 232 La. 747, 95 So. 2d 298 (1957); Welsh v. Welsh, 322 So.
2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976); Berry v. Berry, 300 So. 2d
246 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 310 So. 2d 626 (La. 1975); Authement v.
Authement, 254 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Powell v. Powell, 152 So. 2d 609 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963).
63. See, e.g., Failla v. Grandeury, 295 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); General Tire
Serv. v. Nash, 273 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Leon Godchaux Clothing Co. v. Ruiz,
179 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Hagedorn Motors, Inc. v. Godwin, 170 So. 2d 779
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
64. For a discussion of the latter topic, see, e.g., Tete, A Critique of the Equal Man-
agement Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REV. 491 (1979).
65. Compare Thornton v. Thornton, 377 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), with
Nolte v. Nolte, 258 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 261 La. 538, 260 So. 2d 321
(1972). See also Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 881 (1974); Note, 38 LA. L. REV. 1096 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979); Bruner v. Bruner, 373 So. 2d
971 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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Code civil, 7 the husband and wife are to choose the conjugal domi-
cile by common agreement. Moreover, the French Code refers ex-
pressly to the concept of parental authority, 68 while the Louisiana
Civil Code, at least in its major headings, still speaks in terms of
paternal authority. 9
Second, does the subordination of the wife to the husband's
authority under article 120 as long as he provides material comfort
reflect the contemporary view of the marital relationship? Within a
perhaps elite and privileged class in society, it is not uncommon to
find that both partners to the marriage have professional training
and both may be pursuing separate and equally prestigious and
satisfying careers. In such circumstances, if the economic rationale
for article 120 is recognized, the choice of a conjugal abode should
be left to the mutual decision of both partners; the law should not
give the husband the privilege of suing his wife for separation on
the ground of abandonment simply because she does not wish to
adhere to his choice of a conjugal domicile which answers exclu-
sively his professional needs. The express language of article 120
simply does not take this contingency into account, giving some, if
not all, husbands an unwarranted legal advantage.
More importantly, however, the reevaluation of the role of wo-
men in society goes beyond the ideology of a particular socioeco-
nomic stratum and has become a fairly pervasive value within soci-
ety as a whole. The incorporation of the equal management
principle into the community property regime is testimony to the.
wider social currency of the principle of equality among
spouses-that one spouse is not, simply because of sex, less capa-
ble of making decisions affecting the position of the family in soci-
ety. The language of article 120 is a discordant echo from the past.
Indeed, there is a misanthropic tenor to the language which depre-
ciates and demeans the conjugal union-wives should render ser-
vile obedience to husbands as long as they are paid for their will-
ingness to cohabit with them. This is an outmoded and offensive
conception of what it means to have married persons live together
as part of their legal and public policy obligations toward one an-
other. The substance of article 120 should be aligned with the mu-
tuality principle that governs article 119, borrowing to some extent
from the example of its counterpart in the French Code civil.
67. C. civ. art. 215.
68. Id. arts. 371-387.
69. See Title VII, ch. 5 of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code.
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THE ROLE OF FAULT
The Predominance of Fault
The role of fault in the imposition of legal liability is one of
the most controversial questions in all of legal literature; it sur-
faces not only in divorce and alimony determinations, but also in
other critical areas of the law-the law of torts and the debate sur-
rounding the concept of strict liability being a prime example.
Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code makes the concept of fault70 a
central factor in the determination of whether a marriage will be
legally dissolved and also in assessing the financial consequences of
such a dissolution. The grounds for separation in the Louisiana
Civil Code can be characterized as hybrid and somewhat im-
balanced, since they include both a fault and a nonfault
component.
Article 138,1 which enumerates ten causes for separation from
bed and board, does not adhere exclusively to a fault-based notion
of separation, but it nonetheless lends primacy to the concept of
fault. The first eight causes represent the traditional fault grounds
for separation contained in most civil codes, including adultery,
conviction of a serious criminal offense, habitual intemperance or
cruel treatment, abandonment, and the like.7 2 Article 138 then lists
two nonfault or mutual consent grounds which are based upon vol-
untary de facto separation of the spouses for a given period of
time. The fault grounds, however, are enumerated first and in
some detail, while the nonfault grounds are given less prominence
in the body of article 138, being listed last.7
The hybrid character of the grounds for separation and ulti-
mately for divorce in the Louisiana Civil Code points to a tension
between the express and implied definition of marriage. Attribut-
ing such evident primacy to the fault concept of divorce (divorce as
70. The concept of fault in the area of Persons has given rise to numerous commenta-
ries; a representative sample of the leading recent studies includes: Couch, Toward a More
Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TUL. L. REV. 243 (1969); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisi-
ana Appellate Courts for the 1979-1980 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 41 LA. L. REv. 372
(1981); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979
Term-A Faculty Symposium, 40 LA. L. REV. 543 (1980); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 39 LA. L.
REV. 659 (1979).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 138 (West Supp. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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a sanction) and maintaining a rigid distinction between separation
from bed and board and immediate divorce (allowing the latter
only for egregious fault, thereby mandating recourse to the former)
per force make the dissolution of marriage difficult and painstak-
ing. The Louisiana codal provision, therefore, voices at least im-
plicitly an ecclesiastic view of marriage-marriage as an indissolu-
ble sacramental bond. At the same time, the Code contains an
expressly secular definition of marriage; according to the language
of article 86, marriage is considered "in no other view than as a
civil contract. '74 If marriage is in fact understood as a civil con-
tract-devoid of religious overtones, not only should the dissolu-
tion of marriage be allowed, but also the means of dissolving mar-
riage should be seen as an officiaf way of stating that the marital
union has become intolerable for at least one spouse. The sub-
stance of article 138 allows the notion of the state regulation of
marriage and the family for the well-being of the community to
overshadow the concept of marriage as a civil contract which can
be rescinded by the parties for "defective" performance. As such,
the predominance of fault gives the value of family solidarity its
strongest expression: marriages, as a general rule, will not be dis-
solved unless there has been a grave violation of marital duties
and, once such a violation has been established, the culprit must
be made to pay for his wrongful conduct. One wonders, however,
whether making separation and divorce difficult by incorporating
an unbending concept of fault into the separation and divorce
grounds is indeed supportive of the value of family solidarity.
Is a nineteenth century quasi-ecclesiastic view of marriage rel-
evant in the late twentieth century? Do marriages fail because one
spouse bears the burden of fault exclusively? Is the notion of cul-
pability workable in this traumatic and highly personal context?
Although fault-based determinations may be appropriate in some
(perhaps exceptional) cases, divorce should be seen as a solution to
a difficult problem which minimizes personal antagonisms rather
than as a form of punishment. Relegating the traditional fault
grounds to a limited role in the termination of marriage would lend
support to the view that the parties to the marital contract can
decide when their agreement is no longer viable, that they need
not go through the agonizing process of arguing culpability back
and forth, and that the psychological reality of bankrupt marriages
74. Id. art. 86.
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precludes any reference to legal fault in most cases. The legislative
"preoccupation with fault"'7 can be seen as an unwarranted in-
fringement upon the freedom of individuals to make choices that
seriously affect the course of their lives.
The realities of life and personal relationships make little
room for an unbending and absolute view of marriage; a humanly
intolerable situation needs a workable remedy, not an antiquated
ideological gloss. Objections to religious underpinnings aside, a
more neutral and pragmatic sociological view of marriage also
might argue for the supremacy of fault. A disincentive to divorce
might maintain the solidarity of the family in a rapidly evolving
society. Encouraging, if not mandating, the continuation of unsta-
ble and unhappy unions, however, may not provide the proper en-
vironment in which to raise children or have people spend their
adult lives. Making the remedy of separation and divorce more ac-
cessible to spouses who deem that their marriage no longer is a
viable personal enterprise would not undermine family solidarity,
but, in fact, might strengthen it. The law has a two-fold mission in
this area. It must achieve a viable equilibrium between individual
and societal interests by inculcating, on the one hand, a sense of
the importance of marriage and the family in the community and,
on the other hand, by providing individuals with a relatively easy
means to disengage themselves from a tormenting bond.
Recommendations
Rather than enumerating the worst possible conduct that
spouses can inflict upon one another, article 138, in an effort to
align itself with the substance of article 86, could outline morally
neutral grounds upon which a separation and ultimately a divorce
can be granted. For example, article 138 could list (1) medical rea-
sons for granting a separation, e.g., incurable mental disease, vene-
real disease, an incurable and repugnant disease, or a contagious
illness; (2) basic incompatibility of temperament, when at least one
of the spouses is convinced that they simply do not get along; and
(3) de facto separation of the spouses for a required period of time,
reflecting an irremediable breakdown of relations between the
spouses. Under this framework, separation and divorce would cease
to carry much of its social stigma; it no longer would connote per-
75. See Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (Beer, J., concur-
ring); Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Beer, J., concurring).
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sonal culpability and failure, but would stand for the view that the
marriage no longer is a viable union for the spouses; that the fail-
ure of communication has been such that it has engendered a
bankruptcy of the joint venture. Much like the grounds under arti-
cle 138(9) and (10), the notion of incompatibility of temperament
and de facto separation imply mutual consent grounds, the law
recognizing that the spouses are responsible and in the best posi-
tion to assess the quality of their relationship. A separation and
divorce upon the basis of fault should be an exceptional proceed-
ing, the culpability factor being relegated to a deserved secondary,
if not tertiary, status in the breakdown of marriage.
A Comparative Reference
When contrasted with its French counterpart," article 138
manifests a definite preference for fault-based separation. The re-
cently revised French codal provision lists three grounds for sepa-
ration and divorce in the following order: (1) mutual consent; (2)
break up of the common life; and (3) the traditional grounds for
divorce." The French Code civil establishes mutual consent as the
preferred ground in separation and divorce cases; the reference to
the traditional fault grounds appears last and does not involve any
extensive enumeration. 78 The ostensible purpose of the French leg-
islation is to attenuate, if not eliminate, the unpleasant and con-
tentious character of separation and divorce proceedings by mini-
mizing the role of fault in such litigation.
Despite the historical affinity between the two civilian juris-
dictions, the French solution may not be entirely appropriate in
Louisiana. The aim of the comparison is not to make the Louisiana
Civil Code a carbon copy of the French Code civil, but rather to
determine whether the concept of fault as it is incorporated in the
Louisiana codal provisions remains viable in light of the experi-
mentation and reform in other civilian jurisdictions. Although the
76. C. civ. art. 229.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The new French divorce legislation has given rise to numerous commentaries and
studies. See, e.g., CENTRE NATIONAL RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, REFORMES DU DROIT DE LA
FAMILLE, in 20 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1975); R. LINDON & P. BERTIN, DIVORCE
76 (1976); J. MASsW, LA REFORME DU DIVORCE (1976); J. MASSIP & G. MORTIN, LA REFORME
DU DIVORCE (1976); Audit, Recent Revisions of the French Civil Code, the French Divorce
Reform Law of 1976, 38 LA. L. REV. 747 (1978); Glendon, The French Divorce Reform Law
of 1976, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 166 (1976).
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hybrid character of article 138 shows a tendency toward liberaliza-
tion, the prominence of the fault grounds in the body of the provi-
sion reflects a retributive rather than remedial concept of separa-
tion and divorce. The Code holds steadfastly to a conservative,
traditional view, perhaps in the name of upholding the value of
family solidarity. Within the framework of article 138, the mutual
consent grounds appear to be a hesitant afterthought, a begrudging
and partial willingness to admit that some social evolution has
taken place since article 138 was originally enacted.
An Organic Interpretation of Fault
The cardinal importance attributed to the fault rationale by
the Louisiana Civil Code in the breakdown of marriage raises ana-
lytic problems not only with the substance of article 138, but also
with other provisions of Book I. When article 138 is viewed in rela-
tion to articles 141 and 160,80 the status of the fault rationale
comes into question. Does one definition of fault apply to separa-
tion questions and yet another apply to alimony determinations?
What is the impact of the new language of article 141 upon separa-
tion and alimony issues? Does it have a separate impact upon each
of these considerations? The following analysis addresses these and
other salient problems which arise in Book I as a result of the pri-
macy of fault in separation, divorce, and alimony determinations.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFORMULATION OF ARTI-
CLE 141
Before the enactment of article 141 in its present form,"'
under the theory of recrimination and its equitable rationale of
"unclean hands," if each spouse could establish fault on the part of
the other, both were prevented from obtaining a separation or di-
vorce.8 2 The courts applied the principle of recrimination in cases
in which the spouses were deemed to be equally at fault, reasoning
that remedies were reserved to an offended and nonculpable
80. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 141 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
81. Id. art. 141.
82. See, e.g., Brocato v. Brocato, 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 371
So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979); Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Couvillion
v. Couvillion, 346 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 352 So. 2d 378
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Denbo v. Denbo, 345 So.. 2d 1257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Richard
v. Richard, 340 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). See also Note, 24 Loy. L. REv. 776
(1978).
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spouse.83 In order to deal with cases in which there was a dispro-
portion between the fault of the parties, the courts invoked the
doctrine of comparative rectitude under which the spouse who was
guilty of a lesser fault became entitled to relief. 84 Comparative rec-
titude, then, eliminated the inequity that could result from a rigid
judicial application of the recrimination principle by allowing the
courts to find a sufficient disparity between the respective fault of
the parties to provide one of them with a remedy. Presumably,
although entitled to a separation, the spouse who had a lesser fault
could not seek permanent alimony upon the granting of a divorce.
The new language of article 141 eliminates the blatant ineq-
uity that flowed from an application of the theory of recrimination
by providing that "separation from bed and board shall be granted
although both spouses are mutually at fault in causing the separa-
tion."88 While mutual fault now does not prevent the spouses from
obtaining a separation and (presumably) ultimately a divorce, fault
remains a determinative factor in assessing the financial conse-
quences of the dissolution. The language of article 141 further pro-
vides that "[i]n such instances, alimony pendente lite may be al-
lowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed thereafter
following divorce."8 This language accords with the substance of
article 160 which requires that a spouse seeking permanent ali-
mony be free of fault.87
The 1976 enactment of article 141 was the product of a liberal-
izing trend aimed at eliminating the theory of recrimination: when
two persons are seeking to dissolve their marriage and each has
established the fault of the other under article 138 (1) to (8), they
should not be denied a remedy simply because both were at fault.88
Under contemporary thinking, a contrary result is too egregious to
justify in the name of any policy, no matter what its ideological or
doctrinal underpinnings. While it is clear that the new language of
article 141 eliminates the doctrine of recrimination, there remains
some question as to whether it actually has or should have the
same effect upon the doctrine of comparative rectitude-if not for
purposes of separation under article 138, at least for purposes of
83. See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 139.43.
84. Id.
85. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 141 (West Supp. 1982).
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 160.
88. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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the permanent alimony determination under article 160. It could
be argued that recrimination and comparative rectitude were so in-
extricably intertwined in a functional sense that once the former
was eliminated the utility of the latter ceased altogether. Despite
such arguments, the role of comparative rectitude, reinterpreted to
function as does the doctrine of comparative negligence in tort lia-
bility cases, may not have been completely extinguished, especially
in light of the fact that article 141, once it applies, precludes per-
manent alimony for either spouse. A weighing of the respective
fault of the parties for the alimony determination could have sig-
nificant practical and doctrinal import.
COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE IN THE CONTEXT OF PERMA-
NENT ALIMONY DETERMINATIONS
It is evident that, under the current language of article 141,
the doctrine of comparative rectitude no longer can serve its previ-
ous equitable function. Now, regardless of mutual fault, spouses
can obtain a legal remedy. Article 141 speaks expressly in terms of
the mutual and not the equal fault of the spouses. Viewing article
141 as a type of bridge between articles 138 and 160, one might
interpret the separation and alimony provisions of article 141 to
mean that, once either party establishes that the other spouse has
engaged in conduct covered by article 138 (1) to (8), he or she may
obtain a separation and ultimately a divorce, but that neither is
entitled to permanent alimony. This interpretation of the implica-
tions of article 141 leaves a number of critical questions unan-
swered: Does the failure to refer explicitly to equal fault mean that
the relative weighing of the respective fault no longer can take
place in any context for any purpose? In light of its alimony provi-
sion, is the reference to fault in article 141 synonymous with fault
under article 138? Can a distinction be made between fault for
separation purposes and fault for permanent alimony considera-
tions, between legal fault and a factually-established but legally
nonactionable fault under article 160? Using a reasoning reminis-
cent of the doctrine of comparative rectitude, could article 141 be
interpreted to mean that the spouse who is guilty of a much lesser
fault than the other is still entitled to some form of permanent
alimony under article 160?
In a recent opinion,89 Judge Beer expressed the problem elo-
89. Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
0
19811 1023
Loyola Law Review
quently and cogently:
We continue to be preoccupied with "fault" (which Webster defines
as a moral weakness less serious than a vice), and that preoccupa-
tion continues-more often than not-to result in knee jerk deter-
minations of "mutual fault."
It is an oversimplification to say that a marriage of 25 or 30
years which has gone stale, with resulting degrees of disappoint-
ment, contempt, disgust, and, finally, abhorrence on the part of the
parties, is the result of "mutual fault" to the extent that such deter-
mination absolutely preempts any consideration of alimony. Unless
one or the other of the parties has conducted himself or herself in a
totally abhorrent and classically unacceptable way, the determina-
tion of an award of permanent alimony should not be irrebuttably
preempted on a premise of such a disjointed, nebulous concept as
"mutual fault." What is, in most cases, nothing more or less than
mutual disillusionment should not summarily deprive either party
of their justiciable right to seek alimony.90
In his evaluation of the "jurisprudential treatment of the alimony
issue"91 in Louisiana, Judge Beer further states that, "from the
standpoint of realism and common sense. . . the central guideline
should be need-instead of fault (or gender)." 9" Article 141 does
not explicitly abolish comparative rectitude and, as a consequence,
the doctrine could be retained in some form as an instrument of
judicial construction applying to permanent alimony determina-
tions. Indeed, if the Louisiana Code is to maintain some commit-
ment to the fault rationale while pursuing a liberalization of the
law in this area, the doctrine of comparative rectitude might con-
stitute a useful first step in attenuating the doctrinal impact of the
fault concept.
THE FLOATING FAULT CALCULUS
Article 138 (1) to (8) defines the notion of fault by enumerat-
ing a presumably exhaustive list of marital fault categories. Some
of the fault grounds are less rigorous than others. For example, the
abuse of alcohol is a less comprehensive and less open-ended
ground than cruel treatment, which the decisional law has inter-
preted to include mental cruelty." Moreover, some of the provi-
90. Id. at 272-73 (Beer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 273.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 380 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 383
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sions appear to be inconsistent on their face;' 4 others seem to pose
considerable problems of interpretation in relation to other provi-
sions in the Code. 95 Be that as it may, article 138 establishes no
grading or ordering of the grounds in terms of a substantive hierar-
chy; it seems that some grounds are easier to establish than others
or they at least reflect less blameworthy conduct (mental cruelty
being assessed by a subjective standard is a case in point)." De-
pending upon how a particular court reads the specific circum-
stances of individual cases, it is possible to have a widely varying
scale of conduct amounting to legal fault in the marriage context:
from quotidian friction and constant nagging to abuse of stimu-
lants and intentional nonsupport to outright physical brutality.
A priori, there is nothing wrong with having fault grounds
which cover a vast spectrum of conduct; in fact, it may be a way of
liberalizing the fault concept for separation purposes without erad-
icating it or unduly minimizing it. If the spouses want to state offi-
cially why their marriage broke down in terms of the causative cat-
egories provided by law, they can do so and gain whatever
satisfaction is offered by such a procedure. They may want the dis-
parity and disproportion between their conduct to be recognized:
the wife may be a habitual nagger while the husband is addicted to
alcohol; the wife may have committed adultery while the husband
was standing trial for a felony; the husband may have publicly de-
famed his wife after she attempted to take his life. Whether the
spouses want to terminate their joint venture on the basis of mu-
tual consent or as a result of what each of them conceives to be the
fault of the other, they should be afforded an appropriate legal
remedy. The disproportion between the respective wrongful con-
duct is of no significance provided the effect of fault, determined
So. 2d 1263 (La. 1980); Gibbon v. Gibbon, 337 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Loyd v.
Loyd, 336 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); McVay v. McVay, 276 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973); Manley v. Manley, 188 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
94. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 138(7) (West Supp. 1982), which speaks of a spouse
being charged with a felony, then refers to evidence indicating that the spouse has actually
been guilty of such a felony. Also, one wonders why article 138(6) is not included in the
article 139 enumeration along with adultery and conviction of felony. It seems that the at-
tempt on the life of one spouse by the other would be as serious as the other two grounds.
For this latter point, I am indebted to Mr. David Amoni, a third-year law student at Tulane
University School of Law. Finally, it seems inconsistent to have the paragraphs, article
138(9) & (10) essentially performing the same function on the basis of different statutory
periods of voluntary separation.
95. Most notably, the problem of the interrelation between id. arts. 138, 141 & 160.
96. See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 116.
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under article 138, is limited to the granting of a separation and
divorce.
Once fault is established, however, it does technically, as
Judge Beer pointed out,9 have a dispositive effect upon whether a
spouse is entitled to alimony (and it may also have an indirect im-
pact upon the child custody question). Here, both articles 141 and
160 appear to provide that, once a spouse is held to be at fault
under article 138, he or she is barred from receiving permanent
alimony (regardless of need).98 The disproportion between the
wrongful acts for purposes of this determination should be rele-
vant, especially if the need on the part of the spouse who is less at
fault is substantial. The utility of maintaining the doctrine of com-
parative rectitude for alimony purposes," then, is evident; it con-
stitutes a means by which to introduce different definitions of the
concept of marital fault in the several articles and to establish
that, although a given conduct may be actionable as fault for arti-
cle 138 separation purposes, it does not constitute a legal or proxi-
mate cause or fault for purposes of permanent alimony determina-
tions under article 160. This floating fault calculus, while it would
increase their discretion in these matters, would allow the courts to
minimize the impact of fault upon the financial consequences of a
dissolution of marriage and emphasize the consideration of need at
least in circumstances in which a spouse has done relatively little
to make the marriage fail according to technical legal conceptions.
To some extent the courts already have laid the groundwork
for these separate definitions of marital fault. In interpreting and
applying article 160, for example, the courts have referred to fault
in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, they have considered arti-
cle 160 fault (which is dispositive of the alimony question) as the
equivalent of a finding of fault under article 138(1) to (8):10o if a
spouse is adjudged to have been mentally cruel, then that spouse
97. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
98. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 140 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
99. For an application of the doctrine, see, e.g., Douglas v. Douglas, 342 So. 2d 1124
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ re-
fused, 258 La. 775, 247 So. 2d 868 (1971); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 196 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967).
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See also Doug-
las v. Douglas, 385 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 386 So. 2d 358 (La. 1980);
Brocato v. Brocato, 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La.
1979); Saucier v. Saucier, 357 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); R. PASCAL, supra note 4,
at 235-39.
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has been at fault and is not entitled to permanent alimony,
whatever his or her need may be. On the other hand, and in almost
the same breath, the courts have spoken of actionable fault under
article 160 as conduct of a serious nature which amounts to an in-
dependent contributing factor or a proximate cause of the separa-
tion.101 This double characterization is not without its doctrinal
implications, especially in a civilian jurisdiction in which the Code
outlines expressly the instances of marital fault for separation pur-
poses. By adopting this proximate cause formulation to refer to
fault, the courts appear to be asking for a certain latitude in inter-
preting and a certain discretion in applying the fault concept
under article 160. To avoid gross inequity and patent injustice,
there is a need, felt by the jurisprudence, to incorporate some
equivalent of the doctrine of comparative rectitude into the ali-
mony area, to devise, in effect, separate definitions of fault for dif-
ferent legal questions relating to the breakdown of a marriage.
The argument for construing the Louisiana Civil Code to pro-
vide for a floating fault calculus between articles 138, 141 and 160
(which admittedly has been motivated by the conviction that the
concept of fault occupies an altogether unwarranted place of pri-
macy in this area) loses some of its thrust in the face of the juris-
prudential rule that, once the fault question has been litigated in a
separation proceeding, it cannot be relitigated in the divorce pro-
ceeding unless there has been post-separation fault.10 2 It seems,
however, that the relitigation issue is one question, while the issue
of whether the finding of fault for separation purposes will be
binding for article 160 alimony is another question altogether. Al-
though the type of conduct required to fall within the limits of
article 138(3) and ultimately to invoke the remedy provided for in
article 141 may be quite minimal, the preclusion of a spouse in
need from permanent alimony should reflect, in the words of Judge
Beer, "totally abhorrent" conduct. 103 When two persons are in-
volved in an unsatisfactory and perhaps agonizing personal rela-
tionship, it is extremely unlikely that either spouse can escape the
reach of a flexible culpability rule (if that consideration is at all
relevant in these circumstances). A finding of legal fault (which, in
101. See generally cases cited note 100 supra.
102. See, e.g., Laurent v. Laurent, 369 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 371
So. 2d 1343 (La. 1979); DeFatta v. DeFatta, 352 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Perez v.
Perez, 334 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 4th Cir.),.cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 700 (La. 1976); Schillaci v.
Schillaci, 339 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
103. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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effect, may have little to say about the conduct or the character of
the person) should not bar the spouse who is at a substantial
financial disadvantage from gaining some type of minimal support
for a period of time. This type of result is buttressed by the prag-
matic consideration that the State would otherwise bear the
financial burden of such an outcome and also, more importantly,
by a basic sense of humanity and justice-not to speak of common
sense.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 141
The courts have construed the substance of article 141 without
directly resolving the question of whether it eliminates the doc-
trine of comparative rectitude. In Brocato v. Brocato,'04 a case de-
cided in 1979, the court held that "it is [not] necessary for the trial
court to weigh the proportional wrongs of each party under the
doctrine of comparative rectitude." 05 The court reasoned that "[i]f
the fault of each party, equal or unequal, standing alone is suffi-
cient to award the other a judgment of separation, then their re-
spective fault is deemed to be mutual."' 06 The jurisprudence, then,
harmonizes perfectly with the express language of article 141;
neither source, however, addresses the question of the future status
of the doctrine of comparative rectitude and its implications upon
the permanent alimony determination. Is the fault determination
for separation purposes to be the same for permanent alimony
considerations?
THE OSTENSIBLE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 141
Article 141 provides that "[a] separation from bed and board
shall be granted although both spouses are mutually at fault in
104. 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979).
105. Id. at 1086.
106. Id. Other recent decisions have held in the same vein: Post v. Post, 376 So. 2d
1275 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (article 141 does not require a finding of equal degrees of fault
before a separation can be granted); Rittiner v. Sinclair, 374 So. 2d 680, 682 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979) ("only fault which' defeats a wife's entitlement to post-divorce alimony is fault
which is sufficient to constitute grounds within C.C. 138 for separation in favor of the hus-
band."); Guin v. Guin, 378 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) ("degree of fault neces-
sary to warrant a separation under any of the provisions of Art. 138 has been defined as
'unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband or wife which so grievously wounds
mental feelings of the other, or such as in any manner utterly destroys the legitimate ends
and objects of matrimony.' ") (quoting Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, 226, 111 So. 683, 685
(La. 1927)).
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causing the separation. In such instances, alimony pendente lite
may be allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed there-
after following divorce." It seems clear that the substance of article
141 was intended to apply to a rather classical situation. A typical
case would consist of the following circumstances: the fault of the
husband involves regular and violent physical cruelty to the wife as
well as verbal abuse and false accusations; the wife drinks and uses
drugs to excess, and often leaves the matrimonial domicile for ex-
tended periods of time, imposing her small children upon neigh-
bors or relatives. In this case the conduct of each party obviously
would constitute independent grounds for separation under article
138 or would be considered a proximate cause of the separation
under any definition of fault. The fault not only is mutual, but it
appears to be equally grave on both sides. Pending professional
help, such a marriage probably should be dissolved for the good of
all involved, and it should make little difference whether the disso-
lution takes place upon the basis of fault or the mutual consent of
the parties.
Yet financially, the invoking of fault grounds obviously makes
a substantial difference. If one of the spouses is in a precarious
financial position and basically unable to support himself or herself
properly, he or she is unable to obtain any permanent alimony.
Although the basic rationale for such an outcome can be debated,
that is the result mandated by the express language of articles 141
and 160. '
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE FAULT NOTION
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution, 10 8 the courts of a state have jurisdiction to adjudicate
a party's change of marital status if at least one of the parties to
the marriage is domiciled in that state. The celebrated Williams v.
North Carolina cases '09 held that the status established in such ex
107. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 141 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
109. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945). The holdings of these cases have been described as follows: in the first
Williams case, the Supreme Court held "that the ex parte decree of the state of one
spouse's domicil must be recognized throughout the nation by force of the Constitution." In
the second Williams case, "the Court held that, while the state of a spouse's domicil has the
power to grant a divorce entitled to full faith and credit, the issue whether either spouse
was, in fact, domiciled in the state of divorce is open for reexamination." W. WADLINGTON &
M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 414-15 (1978).
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parte divorce proceedings involving a domiciliary was valid in all
sister states;" ° the Estin v. Estin'" and Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt1 2 decisions, however, qualified the interstate impact of such
proceedings by limiting the res judicata effect to the status ques-
tion and refusing to extend it to alimony, property and other inci-
dents of the relationship. Accordingly, under established princi-
ples, a divorce decree'rendered by a sister state-for purposes of
full faith and credit-is divisible:" 3 the status determination is
severable from the ruling on alimony and the financial conse-
quences of the status change. In any event, since an alimony deci-
sion, like a custody ruling, is subject to modification (it is not a
final judgment), it is not entitled to full faith and credit."4 More-
over, in light of the fact that an alimony award is a money judg-
ment, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
to render a valid judgment." 5
Article 160, at first blush, seems to confirm the substance of
these well-established principles; it provides, in relevant part, that
"[a]limony shall not be denied on the ground that one spouse ob-
tained a valid divorce from the other spouse in a court of another
state or country which had no jurisdiction over the person of the
claimant spouse.""' Under this language it is clear that an alimony
judgment rendered by a sister-state jurisdiction against a Louisi-
ana resident will not be given full faith and credit in Louisiana
unless the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the Loui-
siana resident. A problem arises, however, in this regard due to the
article 160 requirement that a spouse seeking alimony be free from
fault.
Assume that one of the spouses to a marriage contracted and
performed in Louisiana leaves the state, establishes a bona fide
domicile in a sister jurisdiction, and sues the other spouse for di-
vorce in that jurisdiction on the basis of the absent spouse's fault.
The litigation proceeds normally and results in a judgment of di-
vorce based upon the absent spouse's fault, say adultery. There is
no mention in the decree of an alimony determination-we may
110. Id.
111. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
112. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 6, 109 (1971). See also Van-
derbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
114. See id. Accord Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19. (1955).
115. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
116. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1982).
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assume that the court in the sister state held that it could not rule
on that matter because it did not have personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse. The migratory spouse returns to Louisiana and
petitions a state court to have the divorce judgment recognized on
the basis of full faith and credit. Unless the other spouse can prove
that the migratory spouse did not obtain a valid domicile in the
sister state, the status change will have to be recognized in Louisi-
ana-the marriage will be considered as legally dissolved.
A problem arises as to the fault determination that was
reached under the status judgment. Remember that the migratory
spouse obtained a divorce based upon the Louisiana spouse's fault
(a fault which appears in the enumeration of articles 138 and 139).
Under the divisibility doctrine, a state is required to give full faith
and credit only to the status part of a sister state divorce decree;
the financial incidents of the status change are severable and not
entitled to full faith and credit. In the hypothetical example, no
alimony determination was made, but the status change was effec-
tuated upon the basis of fault. There is, therefore, a type of cause
and effect relationship that applies-almost by definition -be-
tween the change of status and the reasons for which that change
was made.
If the status determination is to be afforded full faith and
credit, the latter extends to the entire status judgment, i.e., the
actual change and the reasons for it. As a consequence, if the Loui-
siana spouse were to file for alimony, that spouse-in theory at
least-would be refused alimony because the divorce was granted
upon the basis of his or her fault. If the previously quoted lan-
guage of article 160 was meant to integrate the divisibility doctrine
into the substance of the Code, it, however, does not apply here.
The problem is outside the divisibility issue. The Louisiana spouse
would be denied alimony not because a sister jurisdiction so adju-
dicated, but rather because Louisiana law, which applies to the ali-
mony determination, premises all alimony determinations first on
the basis of fault.
In terms of theory, the possibility of such a result raises ques-
tions about the full faith and credit doctrine. That doctrine is,
however, constitutionally mandated. More importantly, the possi-
ble result illustrates the serious disadvantages that flow from the
strict and unbending commitment of the Code to the fault concept
in the alimony area. It is eminently conceivable that the Louisiana
courts would, in practice, simply declare that a sister-state judg-
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ment cannot impinge in any way upon the alimony determination
or deploy a floating fault calculus or similar idea in these circum-
stances. The mere fact that such a problem can arise in purely the-
oretical terms, however, is enough to have the fault scheme recon-
sidered as a viable mechanism by which to transfer wealth upon
the permanent dissolution of marriage.
THE ROLE OF FAULT RECONSIDERED
How much will be sacrificed to preserve the sanctity of fault?
One codal provision views marriage as a secular institution-a civil
contract to which the ordinary principles of contract law apply.
Given the fundamental importance of marriage and the family in
society, however, the principle of individual autonomy in contrac-
tual matters must be tempered by public policy considerations.
The State has a right, even a duty, to foster the stability of mar-
riages and the family in the community. A quasi-ecclesiastic heri-
tage would extend the regulatory authority of the State to its outer
limits and eradicate the notion of individual autonomy to promote
the view that marriage, no matter how agonizing for and destruc-
tive of the individuals involved, is essentially an indissoluble bond.
Under this view as reinterpreted for more secular purposes, divorce
can be had only by alleging odious conduct and engaging in a
painstaking procedural process.
Despite attempts to attenuate the fault ideology, the Louisi-
ana Civil Code, as a document proclaiming the guiding principles
of the Louisiana juridical order, remains unequivocally committed
to fault-based separation and divorce. The substantive provisions
which articulate more contemporary mores and notions of the mar-
riage relationship occupy a distinctively secondary status in the
body of the Code. The nonfault mutual consent grounds for sepa-
ration and ultimately divorce are attached to the end of a long list
of the traditional fault grounds, and there appears to be some con-
fusion about the respective statutory periods of de facto separation
that will permit mutual consent separation. The advances achieved
by article 141 in terms of recrimination are muted when the ugly
specter of fault raises its head to supervise the financial conse-
quences of divorce based upon mutual fault. The substance of arti-
cle 160 is perhaps the chief spokesman for the dominance of the
fault ideology-the absolutist answer to relative and varying
human predicaments. No matter what the need, no matter what
the public fiscal consequence, a spouse who has been at fault, mini-
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mally or otherwise, cannot be granted alimony. All this adhered to
apparently in the name of maintaining the institution of the fam-
ily, but to the neglect of vital human considerations which are at
the very heart of the family unit.
Marriage comprises all the human expectations that accom-
pany love and the birth of children, expectations which sometimes
are frustrated and disappointed for many reasons. In legal terms,
the definition of marriage is stated in less emotional and more con-
ceptual terms, although the words which articulate the idea have
the strongest impact upon the most deeply felt emotions. In Book I
of the Louisiana Civil Code, there seem to be two not entirely har-
monious definitions of marriage: One is that it is a civil contract,
which recognizes unmistakably the possibility of divorce, giving ex-
pression to individual autonomy and responsibility, and the other,
perhaps dispositive, view is that marriage is a nearly indissoluble
union which, for reasons, imagined or otherwise, of social policy or
ideological baggage, can be dissolved principally upon the basis of
egregious wrongful conduct for which the actor in question must be
punished. The very structure of article 138, although it does not
create an explicit ordering among the fault grounds, gives primacy
to the notion of fault. The civil character of marriage seems to
predominate at its inception-it is easy to get married, while the
less secular concept and the notion of State-imposed regulation ap-
pear to govern its dissolution.
People enter into all sorts of contractual relationships with ex-
pectations that become frustrated; once a failure to perform or a
defective performance is established, the question is raised: Which
party is responsible for the breach? Marriage is a special type of
contractual agreement which, of course, can be breached in many
ways. The principal element of the bargain is an exchange, a mu-
tual giving of personalities in the hope that the circumstances of
life will allow them to be compatible. At the moment of marriage,
positive expectations are high and the old myth of the androgyne
stands forth in its strongest form. The risk factor, however, also
can be substantial; impressionistic views can be rendered even
more superficial by strong emotions. The decision to live with an-
other person involves accepting a character and history that will
become fully apparent only through time. Moreover, the fact that a
young adult marries does not eliminate his or her potential for
growth-people can change and perhaps should change with the
lessons of experience. All this to say that a breach of this special
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contract is more a reflection of the evolution of the life processes
and a determination that the potential projected harmony between
two personalities was simply a mutual miscalculation. In some, if
not most, cases of separation and divorce, the alleged fault is no
more than a symptom of a basic clash of personalities. In this sort
of equation, the culpability factor is a mere artifice; although the
term irreconciliable differences may appear to be a frivolous catch-
all phrase, expressing the State's abdication of its responsibilities,
it is perhaps the most accurate representation of what actually
happens when a marriage fails. The root cause of the problem is a
basic and fundamental inability of the spouses to' get along because
of their differences in character and personality. This attitude to-
wards divorce appears to have been adopted in Louisiana with con-
siderable circumspection; indeed, it is the last ground under article
138. It is submitted that the psychological reality of marital break-
downs should be afforded greater prominence in the legal regula-
tion of separation and divorce in Louisiana.
What are the specifically juristic problems with the present
provisions governing the termination of marriage and what solu-
tions can be proposed? There is clearly some doctrinal inconsis-
tency between the position taken in article 86 that marriage is a
civil contract and the heavy emphasis placed upon fault in articles
138, 139, 141 and 160. In terms of the structure of the Code, simply
tagging on mutual consent grounds at the end of the article 138
enumeration is not a particularly felicitous method to integrate
changes of social ideology into the Code. The piecemeal reassess-
ment and modification of Book I has created glaring inconsisten-
cies and unwarranted confusion. In the final analysis, it is an un-
satisfactory approach by which to deal with the substance of a
document that is to act as the juridical beacon for Louisiana's legal
system and unique civilian culture. In these circumstances, it is
necessary to recall Professors Spaht and Shaw's description of
Book I and its desired structural harmony:
Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled "Of Persons" and con-
taining a highly ordered system for the regulation of family life,
shares with other branches of our private law the harmonious struc-
ture that is the hallmark of a civil law system. Because of its
smoothly articulated structure, the codal scheme, the product of the
thought and experience of many generations of legal scholars and
administrators, is highly vulnerable to untoward tinkering with its
several parts. A change in detail may signal a restructuring of the
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whole."'
The enactment of article 138(9) and (10) was more than a
change in detail; it represented a challenge to a formerly unques-
tioned ideology of fault in matters of separation and divorce. This
is the course of action that has been adopted by several civilian
jurisdictions in the recent past, most notably, France. Although
this liberalizing measure may have had a substantial impact in
practice, its implementation into the substance of Book I was
somewhat disguised and hesitant, provoking disorientation in the
basic ideological orientation of the Code in the area of Persons.
The ambiguity of the status of mutual consent separation and di-
vorce became especially pronounced when the fault barrier to ali-
mony determinations remained intact. It is a well-settled rule of
Louisiana law that, while fault is irrelevant in a proceeding for sep-
aration based upon mutual consent, the fault question can be liti-
gated when alimony is requested in a divorce action based upon
mutual consent. 118 The status change can be made without any ref-
erence to fault, but the determination of the financial conse-
quences of divorce, in the absence of an agreement on this matter
by the parties approved by a court, cannot take place without a
fault determination. The mutual consent notion has had no impact
upon the alimony provisions.
A possible remedy to the fundamental disharmony occasioned
in the fabric of the Code by the incorporation of the mutual con-
sent concept would be to rely upon the courts to exercise their dis-
cretion in these matters and to manipulate the codal provisions so
as to avoid their unsalutary effects. The notion of a floating fault
calculus buttressed by the doctrine of comparative rectitude and
the notion of fault as a proximate causative factor might constitute
a judicially articulated and applied solution. In systemic terms,
however, especially in a civilian jurisdiction, judicial artifice-no
matter how astute-does not appear to be the most propitious so-
lution. The Louisiana Civil Code has a distinguished history and
occupies a position of cardinal importance in Louisiana's legal sys-
tem and culture. Its provisions on the law of Persons deserve bet-
117. Spaht & Shaw, note 46 supra.
118. See, e.g., Laurent v. Laurent, 369 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 371
So. 2d 1343 (La. 1979); DeFatta v. DeFatta, 352 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Moon v.
Moon, 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977); Schillaci v.
Schillaci, 339 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). See also Wagner v. Wagner, 248 So. 2d 96
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3946(C) (West 1979).
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ter than piecemeal attention which leaves the Code dressed in in-
congruity rather than clarity. Many of the codal articles reflect a
historical affinity with the French legal system and its codification;
they thereby continue to translate a nineteenth century view of the
family, an institution which has undergone a metamorphosis in the
twentieth century. Yet, in the last decade, the French Parliament
restructured altogether the French law on Persons.'" Louisiana's
attachment to other civilian jurisdictions should not remain a
purely historical phenomenon, but rather a source of inspiration
and cooperation leading to the elaboration of legal rules and prin-
ciples which heed the lessons of the past, are mindful of the future,
and respond to the continuing social mutations of the present.
Using the 1975 French law on divorce as a stepping stone, it is
submitted that, in order to achieve the substantive and structural
harmony which must be an attribute of the Louisiana Civil Code if
it is to survive as the fundamental legal document of a United
States jurisdiction, the grounds for separation and divorce be
merged into one article which would order the grounds in terms of
their importance: first, in terms of mutual consent and de facto
separation of the spouses and, then, in the exceptional case, in
terms of the traditional fault motive for separation and divorce.
The fault grounds would not be enumerated expressly in order to
rid the law of the image that it provides a means by which disap-
pointed and disillusioned spouses can vent their anger and bitter-
ness upon one another. In this way, the Code would convey, force-
fully and unmistakably, the view that marriage is a civil contract
in which the will of the partners is constrained by only the most
necessary regulatory provisions. The permissible restraints that
might be imposed upon the litigants are a mandatory period of re-
flection and the duty of the court to remind them that their ac-
tions will have a considerable impact upon their future lives. Real-
istically, and in terms of the legitimate exercise of its regulatory
authority, the State should do no more than this. It cannot select a
spouse for one of its citizens nor should it try to coerce him or her
to remain with a person with whom satisfactory personal commu-
nication no longer is possible. If the State occupies any role in this
process, it should be to assist the spouses to resolve their infelici-
tous union through an amicable settlement rather than to vent
their frustrations through the legal process.
119. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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Obviously, such a substantial modification of the grounds for
separation and divorce would entail an equally considerable and
necessary reformulation of the alimony formula. It is submitted
that the concept of fault in this area carries with it a punitive ra-
tionale that has become totally incongruent with the evolving state
of society. Traditionally, Louisiana law has distinguished between
alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony.12 0 The former is
granted during the separation proceeding and until a divorce de-
cree issues, and is based solely upon the need of the spouse who
"has not. a sufficient income for maintenance";12 ' the latter is
awarded to a spouse upon divorce, and is based first upon a fault
determination and, if the spouse requesting alimony is free from
fault, then upon a need determination. 2 ' Alimony pendente lite
does not involve a fault component and has no ceiling (except that
it is granted in proportion to need and means),'12' but permanent
alimony is premised upon nonculpable conduct and has a maxi-
mum "which shall not exceed one-third" of the liable spouse's in-
come.'24 Alimony pendente lite has a public policy character and
cannot be waived by the agreement of the parties,'2 5 while perma-
nent alimony-according to recent decisional law-is not a
mandatory feature of the law and can be waived by private
agreement.' 26
There is a doctrinal justification for this distinction. Alimony
pendente lite reflects the continuing obligation of support between
the spouses under article 119; a legal separation, while it dissolves
the community property regime and eliminates the duty of conju-
gal cohabitation under article 120, does not undo the mutual duties
of husband and wife under article 119-one of which is support.' 27
Permanent alimony, however, is granted after the bond of marriage
has been completely dissolved. It is not anchored in the obligations
outlined in any codal article. It is, according to the characterization
of the decisional law, a "gratuity.' ' 28 Fault is a dispositive first
hurdle in a permanent alimony determination because it relates di-
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 148 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
121. Id. art. 148.
122. Id. art. 160.
123. Id. art. 148.
124. Id. art. 160.
125. See Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
126. See Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
127. See, e.g., Liles v. Liles, 369 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
128. See, e.g., Latour v. Guilbeau, 256 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); McMath v.
Masters, 198 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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rectly to why the marriage bond was dissolved, whereas need be-
comes the primary and exclusive factor in alimony pendente lite
even though the separation may be or has been granted upon the
basis of the benefited spouse's fault because the article 119 obliga-
tions remain intact.
In terms of doctrine, the distinction between alimony
pendente lite and permanent alimony is well-articulated, although
in a civilian jurisdiction with a strong sense of public policy it is
difficult, despite the technical persuasiveness of the reasoning, to
understand why permanent alimony has no public policy character
while alimony pendente lite does. Moreover, this technical distinc-
tion discounts, even disregards, the impact of legal construction
and rules upon the litigants. If the concepts of marriage and di-
vorce are to be articulated primarily in terms of mutual consent,
the notion of fault has little, if any, place in alimony determina-
tions. If the legal system is to continue to function as an instru-
ment of justice, it cannot refuse to respond to the practical impact
of its rules upon the litigants and the community as a whole. If
marriages fail because initial assessments of personality and char-
acter were wrong on both sides, and culpable conduct is seen as a
symptom of a more fundamental problem, then the financial con-
sequences of divorce should be assessed on a morally and legally
neutral ground-namely, that of need. Much like the child custody
issue addressed in article 146, the question of permanent alimony
should be determined equitably in accordance with the best inter-
ests of the parties involved. It has been argued by one distin-
guished legal scholar that the concept of alimony that should take
hold in Louisiana is the one termed "rehabilitative alimony, ' 12 9 an
equitable sum of money granted to the spouse in need for a fixed
period of time allowing him or her to fashion a new lifestyle.
Clearly, this is the type of notion that would fit in perfectly with
separation and divorce granted on the basis of mutual consent.
129. See Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1979-
1980 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 41 LA. L. REv. 372 (1981). In the 1981 session Senator
Nelson introduced a bill which provided that alimony be rendered upon the basis of need
alone. On June 3, 1981, the bill passed the Senate Committee and the Senate floor. Under
the provisions of the Nelson Bill, alimony is granted to a spouse in need considering his or
her earning capacity, provided the claimant spouse has not committed adultery. There is a
five year maximum period for granting alimony. The bill now is being considered by the
House Committee. I am indebted to Ms. Margaret Groome, a law student at Tulane Law
School, for the press reports, dated April 29, 1981, on this development. The bill was de-
feated in the 1981 session. Senator Nelson, however, indicated that he is considering reintro-
ducing a similar provision in 1982.
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THE LEGITIMACY ISSUE
There are a number of minor, although not totally insignifi-
cant, semantic issues which arise from a reading of the chapters of
Book I which relate to the status of children. For example, while
article 27 defines legitimate children as "those who are born of a
marriage lawfully contracted,"130 and illegitimate children as "such
as are born of an illicit union," 13' article 179 contains a less precise,
potentially ambiguous, definition. Article 179 provides, in relevant
part, that "[]egitimate children are those who are either born or
conceived during marriage,' 3 2 leaving open the question of born or
conceived during the marriage of whom. Under one reading of the
codal language, one could conclude that a child is legitimate pro-
vided he is born while at least one of his biological parents is mar-
ried to another person-a nonbiological parent. Such results have
been reached under the application of article 184,' but it is un-
likely that the legislature intended to foster such ambiguity. To
some extent, the language of article 180 suffers from the same im-
precision. A measure of clarity would be gained by modifying the
language of these articles to meet the standards set by article 27'18
and by article 198 which speaks in terms of the "marriage of their
father and mother.'' 5
Also, article 200,"1 which refers to legitimation by notarial act,
contains a rather unhappy transposition of the language of Act 391
of 1972.'37 The latter amended the article to permit legitimation by
either parent or both if they could marry each other either at the
conception of the child or at the time of the legitimation."8" The
codal text reads in relevant part:
A father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her
illegitimate children by an act passed before a notary ... provided,
there exists at the time of conception or at the time of the legitima-
tion of such children no legal impediment to the marriage of the
130. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1952).
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 179 (West Supp. 1982).
133. See, e.g., Pascal, Who Is The Papa? (The Husband in Louisiana; the Paramour
in France), 18 LA. L. REV. 685 (1958).
134. See notes 130-131 supra and accompanying text.
135. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (West Supp. 1982).
136. Id. art. 200.
137. See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 328.
138. Id.
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father and mother." 9
In complete contradistinction to the purpose of the 1972 Act, the
language of article 200 could be interpreted to mean that, in order
to legitimate a child by notarial act, no legal impediment to the
marriage of the father and mother could exist either at the time of
conception or at the time of legitimation. A reformulation of the
codal language to express unambiguously the intent of the 1972
Act would add clarity and promote the effort to liberalize and en-
courage legitimation.
At least prior to the recent reform of the legislation on legiti-
macy, the chief issue in this area of the law of Persons dealt with
the presumption of paternity articulated in article 184. The text of
article 184 reads the way it does in all other civilian jurisdictions
which subscribe to the pater is est presumption: "The husband of
the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or
conceived during the marriage. ' '140 As such, the presumption of pa-
ternity does not raise any doctrinal or analytic problems. It is sim-
ply meant to respond to the biological fact that the paternity of a
man is more difficult to prove than a woman's maternity. It is
based upon the view that marriage is a legitimate institution that
will be disturbed only exceptionally by adultery and that children
born or conceived within the confines of marriage and given birth
by the wife are entitled to be considered as legitimate offsprings
(i.e., having the husband of their mother as their father) until the
contrary is proven by an action in disavowal. The article estab-
lishes, on its face, a rebuttable presumption of paternity against
the husband of the mother.
According to Professor Pascal, the French courts have applied
and interpreted the presumption of paternity in the way in which
it was intended-merely as a rebuttable presumption. 141 When the
facts contradicted and, in effect, defeated the presumption, the
child was considered illegitimate (born of an illicit union)." '2 At
least prior to 1976, the Louisiana decisional law in many instances
did not share this view of the function of the pater is est presump-
tion, construing it at times as an irrebuttable presumption of pa-
ternity. " 3 Although it led to the most unfortunate results, the Lou-
139. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 200 (West Supp. 1982).
140. Id. art. 184.
141. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Spaht & Shaw, note 46 supra.
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isiana courts considered the article 184 presumption to be an
instrument by which to confer the status of legitimacy upon chil-
dren born of the wife's relationship with a man other than her
husband."
4
In Succession of Goss,'"5 a 1974 case, for example, the court
declared that it was the public policy of Louisiana to "insure that
the legitimacy of a child will be maintained whenever possible,
provide presumptions of the strictest nature, and protect helpless
children, born legitimate, from illegitimation by one or both of
their parents for their own selfish aims."" In effect, the presump-
tion of paternity, in order to safeguard children, was deemed to be
"absolute and irrefutable," but for the action in disavowal which
almost never was successful." 7 According to Professor Spaht,
In order to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy....
Louisiana courts have frequently related two persons in the father-
child bond who could not possibly have a biological connection....
The presumption established in Article 184 was not intended to be
irrebuttable. Strict judicial interpretation of the causes of an action
en desaveu and severe limitations on the right to bring it have ren-
dered the presumption practically irrebuttable. Application of the
presumption occasionally produces absurd results, but its inviolabil-
ity has been favored as a protection to children individually and to
the family as a unit.148
Professor Pascal draws the same conclusion:
For over a century the unwillingness to label a child an illegitimate
has led to decisions which imposed legitimate descent from the hus-
band of the mother on children who never claimed him as father
and imposed paternity on husbands in situations in which no geneti-
cist or layman would even suspect him of fatherhood in fact.14 '
In effect, for purposes of wrongful death and workmen's compensa-
tion actions, the Louisiana courts developed the categories of the
legitimate and the illegitimate father.150
144. Id.
145. 304 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ denied, 309 So. 2d 339 (La.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 869 (1975).
146. Id. at 708 (citations omitted).
147. Id. See also Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So. 2d 619 (1972) and Tan-
nehill v. Tannehill, 226 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
148. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
149. Pascal, supra note 133, at 687-88.
150. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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Under the Louisiana decisional law prior to 1976, the pre-
sumption of paternity ceased to reflect the biological differences
between men and women and the evidentiary difficulties that were
associated with paternity. Rather, it became a convenient instru-
ment by which to give expression to a public policy concern that
the status of illegitimacy be avoided at all possible costs. The
courts perceived the children born of an illicit union as the help-
less and hapless victims of adult conduct-the unknowing third-
party recipients of an ugly and unwanted stigma of social outcasts.
In their enthusiasm to rescue children from the legal, social and
psychological consequences of illegitimacy, the courts failed to per-
ceive that the price of their humanitarianism was not being evenly
distributed throughout society-that, in fact, one class of persons
was being singled out to bear the costs of the campaign to eradi-
cate the category of illegitimacy.
There was no reasonable equivalent to the article 184 pre-
sumption directed at wives until 1980.151 This provision, however,
was eliminated by 1981 legislation. 152 As long as the presumption
was used to compensate for evident and undeniable biological dif-
ferences, no illegal discrimination upon the basis of sex could be
alleged. When the presumption became an instrument for confer-
ring legitimate status upon children and ceased to serve its in-
tended function, husbands were made to bear an onus because of
their sex. While a wife could have an affair and have the child born
of that illicit union declared to be the child of her husband, the
husband who had a child with a woman other than his wife could
not have that child declared to be the legitimate offspring of his
marriage. The costs of attributing the status of legitimacy to adul-
terine children (the net effect of attributing paternity despite evi-
dent biological fact to the contrary) were being borne exclusively
by married men. In light of the recent concern over sex discrimina-
tion issues in Louisiana, especially in the alimony area,158 it is sur-
prising that this patent form of gender-based discrimination went
unnoticed.154 While women might be outraged (and justifiably so)
at the idea of having a child that they did not bear declared to be
their legitimate offspring through the operation of law because of
151. 1980 La. Acts. No. 549, § 1 (amending LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209).
152. 1981 La. Acts. No. 720 (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West Supp.
1982)).
153. See, e.g., Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
154. For other commentaries upon article 184, see, e.g., Note, 40 LA. L. REV. 1024
(1980); Note, 3 So. U. L. REV. 102 (1976).
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their husband's extramiarital activity, this is what has been hap-
pening to men in Louisiana for many years. In their quest to up-
hold the interests of children, the courts seem to have forgotten
about the constitutional ramifications of their decisions, the rights
and interests of unmarried biological fathers, and especially the
rights of innocent husbands.
The sole remedy in these circumstances might have been to
have article 184 amended to read explicitly that it was not an ir-
rebuttable presumption, to have it declared unconstitutional under
the Louisiana Constitution as interpreted by the decisional law, or
to enact a similar provision applying to women and maternity. The
recent legislative reform of the legitimacy provisions, begun in
1976, may have rendered such action unnecessary. Although the
presumption of paternity appears in its traditional formulation, ar-
ticle 186 states a countervailing presumption which can defeat the
application of artic1 184. Article 186 states that "[tihe husband of
the mother is not presumed to be the father of the child if another
man is presumed to be the father."15 This language at least is an
indication that the article 184 presumption is not and should not
be interpreted as an irrebuttable presumption. The contrary pre-
sumption referred to in article 186 seemed to be contained in Civil
Code article 209 relating to proof of filiation which, prior to its
recent amendment, provided that "[e]vidence, that the mother and
alleged father were known as living in a state of concubinage and
resided as such at the time when the child was conceived creates a
rebuttable presumption of filiation between the child and the al-
leged father." '56 The 1981 legislation, however, abrogated this lan-
guage and eliminated, without replacing it, this possible counter-
vailing presumption to the article 184 presumption.1 57 As a result
of this modification, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to find
any language supporting the substance of article 186. The severe
restrictions on the action of disavowal, however, appear to have
been relaxed somewhat, 15 8 indicating that the interpretation of ar-
ticle 184 as an irrebuttable presumption is unwarranted. Finally, if
articles 198 and 199 dealing with the legitimation of children by
the subsequent marriage of their biological parents and the repeal
of the ban against the legitimation of adulterine children are to
155. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 186 (West Supp. 1982).
156. 1980 La. Acts No. 549, § 1 (amending LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 209).
157. 1981 La. Acts No. 720 (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 209 (West Supp. 1982)).
158. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 187-190 (West Supp. 1982).
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have any meaning, 159 the article 184 presumption cannot be inter-
preted as being irrebuttable.
Although this examination of the recent legislation on legiti-
macy is no more than a cursory overview, it does illustrate a liber-
alizing trend in this area that attempts to accommodate the inter-
ests of all the parties involved. All of these considerations,
however, may become irrelevant in light of the decision in Succes-
sion of Brown, 60 a case decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in September 1980 which declared article 919 unconstitutional and
which led to the sweeping changes made by the 1981 legislature in
Title I of Book III of the Civil Code."'
Prior to Brown, a series of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions had whittled away at the discriminatory legislation aimed at
illegitimate children, leaving inheritance, under the Labine v. Vin-
cent'62 decision in 1971, as the only area in which the status of
illegitimacy could result in different treatment. In Trimble v.
Gordon,6" decided in 1977, the Court disregarded two of the three
state interests in the unequal treatment of illegitimate children,
namely, the promotion of legitimate family relationships and the
options that a parent could exercise to insure an illegitimate child
a portion of his estate. 64 In Brown the Louisiana Supreme Court
effectively rejected the third state interest, i.e., the orderly disposi-
tion of property upon death. " If the consequences of Brown are as
radical as they appear to be, there seems to be little reason to
maintain the codal provisions on legitimacy in Book I, since the
legal status of legitimacy and illegitimacy will be devoid of any le-
gal consequences. It is quite clear that article 206166 will become
meaningless if Brown is given its full impact in the Code. The
center of attention, then, may be shifted from problems of illegiti-
macy to those of acknowledgement and proving filiation.167
159. Id. arts. 198 & 199.
160. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981). See Note, 27 Loy.
L. REV. 237 (1981).
161. 1981 La. Acts No. 919 (codified in scattered articles of the Civil Code).
162. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
163. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
164. Id.
165. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
166. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 206 (West Supp. 1982).
167. There are a number of other aspects of Book I which deserve at least some brief
mention in this analytic survey of the codal texts. When compared to its counterparts in the
French Code, C. civ. 343-370, Louisiana Civil Code article 214, dealing with adoption, is
somewhat curious since it does not establish any distinction between simple and plenary
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CONCLUSIONS
The most evident conclusion that can be drawn from this ad-
mittedly selective consideration of Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code is that there is an undeniable and pressing need for a com-
prehensive reassessment of the substance of the codal provisions.
Louisiana is a civilian (to some extent, a hybrid and sui generis)
jurisdiction which is rightly proud of its juridical heritage and cul-
ture. If that tradition is to be perpetuated intact and unsoiled, it
must be revitalized as it has been by the lucid revision and amend-
ment of Book II and the revamping of some parts of Book III. The
area of Persons is indispensable to the organic unity of the Code,
and it is an area of litigation in which the social mutations perhaps
are strongest, the most radical and the quickest to take place. The
issues of palimony, surrogate parenthood and artificial insemina-
tion are on the horizon, and the subject of litigation in a number of
states. 68 It is inconceivable that, in a civilian jurisdiction, the legal
document that contains the guiding principles of the legal order
should be riddled with so many inconsistencies, potential and ac-
tual ambiguities, semantic imprecisions, and in some cases an ide-
ology relating to fundamental social institutions which is but a
shadow of a tradition that was outpaced many years ago by the
dynamics of social evolution.
Without presuming to enter into a debate with two eminent
legal scholars, 16 9 the French civilian tradition was at least a source
of inspiration for the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.
In some instances the French doctrinal writings and judicial opin-
ions still have some relevance to legal interpretation and judicial
determinations in Louisiana. During the last decade, the signifi-
adoption. Under Louisiana law adoption represents a complete severance of ties between the
adoptee and his natural family and a reinstatement of that relationship with the adoptive
family but for maintaining the adoptee's inheritance rights in his natural family. The failure
to establish this familiar distinction and the threat that anything but a total severance can
have upon the process of adoption appears to be an anomaly in the Code. Also, it is some-
what incongruous to read the title of Chapter 5 as "Of Paternal Authority," and to have the
provisions which appear under that chapter to be phrased in terms of parental authority.
The problems associated with tutorship (i.e., splitting it and custody) and the liability for
the delictual acts of children are all beyond the consideration of this textual survey.
168. See, e.g., W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 682-90 (1978);
Castillo, Judges Flip the Family Album, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1981, § 4, at E9, col. 1; Whose
Baby Is It, Anyway? NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 83; Griffin, Surrogate Mothers, STUDENT
LAWYER, Apr. 1981, at 29.
169. I am referring to the debate between Professors Batiza and Pascal concerning the
sources of the Louisiana Civil Code.
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cant date being 1975, the French completely revised their codal
provisions relating to the law of Persons. While the French experi-
ence is not perfect and can be subject to some strong doctrinal
criticism, it can and should serve as a stepping stone for a similar
Louisiana revision in this area. Louisiana's unique stature in the
United States and the world can only be enhanced by developing
its civilian bonds and comparative reference to other legal cultures.
In the last analysis, Book I, while it remains a workable legal docu-
ment thanks to judicial supervision, is sorely in need of compre-
hensive reconsideration-the type of reconsideration exemplified
in the recent legitimacy legislation.
